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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
ERIC JARVIS WARREN, 
Defendant/Appellant, 
Case No. 20000495-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for 
Possession of a Controlled Substance, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (2) (a) (i) (Supp. 1999), in 
the Third Judicial District Court, State of Utah, the Honorable 
Sheila K. McCleve, Judge, presiding. Jurisdiction is conferred 
upon this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (e) 
(1996). See Addendum A (Judgment and Conviction). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
I. Did the trial court err in concluding that the stop and 
frisk of Mr. Warren did not violate his Fourth Amendment right 
against unreasonable search and seizure? 
Standard of Review: "fThe factual findings underlying a 
trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress 
evidence are reviewed under the deferential clearly-erroneous 
standard, and the legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness, 
with a measure of discretion given to the trial judge's 
application of the legal standard to the facts.f" State v. 
Chevre, 2000 UT App 6, 5 6, 994 P.2d 1278 (quotation omitted). 
II. Can the lower court's order be affirmed under the 
inevitable discovery doctrine where the State did not meet its 
burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence? 
Standard of Review: "When reviewing a trial court's order on 
a motion to suppress evidence, we recount the facts in a light 
most advantageous to the trial court's decision." State v. 
James, 1999 UT App 17, f 2, 977 P.2d 489. 
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT 
Appellant Eric Warren's ("Mr. Warren") challenge to the 
traffic stop and Terry frisk are preserved on the record for 
appeal PR.") at 43-44, 47, 49-56, 130-31. His objection to the 
application of the inevitable discovery doctrine is preserved at 
R.131[17-18]. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following constitutional provision is determinative of 
the issues on appeal: 
United States Constitution Amendment IV - Unreasonable 
Searches and Seizures: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of the Proceedings, 
and Disposition in the Court Below. 
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Mr. Warren was charged by information with two counts of 
unlawful possession of a controlled substance, a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i); one 
count of carrying a concealed dangerous weapon, a class B 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-504 (1999); 
and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (Supp. 
1999). R.14-16. An arrest warrant was issued. R.12. 
Mr. Warren moved to suppress the evidence that formed the 
basis of the charges as the fruit of an unconstitutional search 
and seizure. R.43-44, 47, 49-56, 130-31. He argued that the 
officer detained him beyond the reasonable scope of the traffic 
stop and that the subsequent frisk was unreasonable. R.131[3-
10]. The State countered that the stop was not unduly prolonged 
and that the frisk was justified under the circumstances. 
R.131[10-14] . 
The State alternatively argued that the evidence was 
admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine. R.131[13-
14]. The State alleged that a gun, found in Mr. Warren's car, 
would have been discovered during an inventory search of the 
impounded vehicle. R.131[13]. Consequently, Mr. Warren would 
have been arrested for carrying a concealed dangerous weapon and 
searched, leading to discovery of the drugs on his person. Id. 
Mr. Warren asserted that the doctrine did not apply because 
the State did not present any evidence about a gun during the 
3 
suppression hearings. R.131[17-18]. 
The trial court denied the suppression motion, holding that 
the stop did not exceed the scope and the frisk was justified 
under the circumstances. R.64-65; 131[18-19]. The court did not 
reach the Statefs inevitability argument. R.131[18]. 
Mr. Warren entered a conditional guilty plea to possession 
of a controlled substance, a third degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (a) (i), pursuant to Utah Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 11 (i) (2000) and State v. Serv, 758 P.2d 935 
(Utah App. 1988). R.100-07, 111. Mr. Warren appeals from the 
denial of the suppression motion. R.112-13. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
At approximately 4:45 a.m. on November 28, 1999, Officer 
Nathan Swensen ("Swensen") was driving toward his assigned patrol 
area of 900 South to 1700 South and 300 East to Main Street. 
R.130[4-5]. Around 170 South and 200 East, Swensen observed a 
gray Cadillac pulled over to the side of the road. R.130[5]. A 
person, later identified as Mr. Warren, was in the driver's seat; 
another unidentified individual leaned into the front passenger 
window with the door open. Id. The individual shut the door and 
walked away. R.130[6]. Swensen testified that the individual 
did not do anything suspicious as he walked off. R.130[15]. 
Swensen, who observed this activity for less than a minute, did 
not hear any of the conversation that took place, he could not 
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tell what the people were doing, nor did he recognize the car 
from prior suspicious circumstances. R.130[6,15]. Nonetheless, 
Swensen suspected either drug or prostitution related activity 
given the early hour and the fact that there were no open 
businesses or residences in the vicinity. R.130[6-7]. 
Swensen observed Mr. Warren pull away from the curb and make 
a left hand turn onto 200 South, and then a lane change, without 
signaling. R.130[6]. Swensen initiated a traffic stop because 
of the violations. R.130[7]. Swensen said his suspicions did 
not factor into his decision to pull Mr. Warren over. R.130[16]. 
However, he did hope to question Mr. Warren about the previously 
observed activity. Id. 
Swensen informed Mr. Warren that he pulled him over for 
failing to signal. R.130[8]. He requested Mr. Warren's driver's 
license and vehicle registration. Id. Mr. Warren handed 
Swensen his registration and license without any hassle. Id. 
Swensen noticed that the license expired in 1995. Id. Mr. 
Warren explained that he had a current license that had been 
recently stolen. Id. 
Swensen asked Mr. Warren about the other individual, what 
they were doing, why at that time, and whether he dropped the man 
off or just met him. R.130[9]. Swensen admitted that these 
questions were unrelated to and unnecessary for the effectuation 
of the traffic stop. R.130[18]. Mr. Warren told Swensen that 
his mother and the man's mother were acquaintances. R.130[9]. 
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He dropped the man off at 170 South 200 East after they had been 
together at someone's house. Id. Mr. Warren also stated that he 
was looking for packing boxes for his sister who was moving. Id. 
This line of questioning lasted one to two minutes. R.130[18]. 
Swensen went to his patrol car, checked Mr. Warren's 
license, and learned that it was current but had been denied for 
reinstatement fees, meaning that the license was invalid. 
R.130[8-9]. Swensen then decided to impound Mr. Warren's car. 
R.130[10]. He asked Mr. Warren to get out of the car to sign a 
citation for failure to signal and for driving without a valid 
license. R.130[10]. Swensen testified that he did not intend to 
arrest Mr. Warren, and had him step out of the car only to inform 
him about the impound and to sign the citations. R.130[21-22]. 
Swensen next frisked Mr. Warren. R.130[10]. He testified 
that he did not suspect Mr. Warren to be armed or dangerous, but 
that he frisks everyone as a matter of routine. R.130[10,20] . 
He also explained that people involved in drugs and prostitution 
are usually armed. R.130[10]. A white plastic twist, later 
identified as cocaine, fell from Mr. Warren's waist during the 
frisk. R.84,130[20-21]. Further search of Mr. Warren's person 
revealed another twist of cocaine, some methamphetamine, and a 
clear glass pipe. R.84; see Addendum B (Written Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law).1 
1
 The facts are recited in a light most favorable to the 
trial court's order denying Mr. Warren's motion to suppress. See 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in denying Mr. Warren's motion to 
suppress the drugs that were illegally seized in violation of his 
Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure. 
See United States Const, amend. IV; Utah Const. Art. I, § 14. 
The search and seizure was illegal because the searching officer 
went beyond the legitimate scope of the traffic stop, see State 
v. Chevre, 2000 UT App 6, 994 P.2d 1278; State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 
1127 (Utah 1994), and then frisked Mr. Warren without any 
reasonable suspicion that he was armed and dangerous. See Terry 
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). 
Moreover, the evidence is not admissible under the 
inevitable discovery doctrine. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 
431, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984). The doctrine does 
not apply because the State did not meet its burden of proof by a 
preponderance of the evidence that a gun was found in the car 
which would have led to Mr. Warren's arrest and subsequent 
search, or that the drugs otherwise inevitably would have been 
found on him. Id. at 444. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT MR. WARREN 
WAS NOT SEARCHED IN VIOLATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
WHERE THE OFFICER EXCEEDED THE LEGITIMATE SCOPE OF A 
TRAFFIC STOP AND DID NOT HAVE A REASONABLE SUSPICION 
THAT MR. WARREN WAS ARMED AND DANGEROUS WHEN HE FRISKED 
State v. Ziealeman, 905 P.2d 883, 884 (Utah 1995). 
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HIM. 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
guarantees "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures." See also Utah Const. Art. I, § 14 
(same). "The Fourth Amendment protection from unreasonable 
searches and seizures applies to investigatory stops of vehicles, 
regardless of the reason for the stop or the brevity of the 
detention." State v. Humphrey, 937 P.2d 137, 141 (Utah App. 
1997) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 
1391, 1396, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979)). 
"The touchstone of [an] analysis under the Fourth Amendment 
is always fthe reasonableness in all the circumstances of the 
particular government invasion of a citizen's personal 
security.1" Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108-09, 98 S.Ct. 
330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.I, 19, 
88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). 
The traffic stop at issue here was conducted in violation of 
Mr. Warren's Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search 
and seizure because it exceeded the reasonable scope of a traffic 
stop, .see Chevre, 2000 UT App 6, If 8-9; Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132, 
and the subsequent Terry frisk was not legally based on a 
reasonable suspicion that Mr. Warren was armed and dangerous. 
See Terry, 392 U.S. at 30-31, see also United State's Const, 
amend. IV; see also Utah Const. Art. I, § 14. Hence, the trial 
8 
court erred in denying Mr. Warren's motion to suppress evidence 
seized as a result of the illegal search and seizure. See Mapp 
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961) 
(requiring exclusion of evidence illegally seized by state agents 
in violation of defendant's Fourth Amendment rights). 
A. The Trial Court Erred in Concluding That the 
Detention Did Not Exceed the Reasonable Scope of the 
Traffic Stop. 
"[A] police officer is constitutionally justified in 
stopping a vehicle if the stop is 'incident to a 
traffic violation committed in the officers' 
presence.'" State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 
1994) (quoting State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489, 491 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990)). "[A]s long as an officer suspects 
that the 'driver is violating any one of the multitude 
of applicable traffic and equipment regulations,' the 
police officer may legally stop the vehicle." Id. 
(quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661, 99 
S.Ct. 1391, 1400, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979)); see also 
State v. Spuraeon, 904 P.2d 220, 225 (Utah Ct. App. 
1995) (providing that equipment violations are traffic 
violations justifying investigative stop by law 
enforcement).... 
"Once a traffic stop is made, the detention 'must 
be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to 
effectuate the purpose of the stop.' " Lopez, 873 P.2d 
at 1132 (quoting Florida v. Rover, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 
103 S.Ct. 1319, 1325, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983)). If there 
is investigative questioning that detains the driver 
beyond the scope of the initial stop, it "must be 
supported by reasonable suspicion of more serious 
criminal activity. Reasonable suspicion means 
suspicion based on specific, articulable facts drawn 
from the totality of the circumstances facing the 
officer at the time of the stop." Id. If the officer 
reasonably suspects more serious criminal activity, 
"the scope of the stop is still limited." Id. The 
officer must "diligently pursue[ ] a means of 
investigation that [is] likely to confirm or dispel 
[his or her] suspicions quickly, during which time it 
[is] necessary to detain the defendant." State v. 
Grovier, 808 P.2d 133, 136 (Utah [] App. 1991). 
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State v. Chevre, 2000 UT App 6, 11 8-10, 994 P.2d 1278. 
The trial court made the following findings in concluding 
that the traffic stop of Mr. Warren was constitutional: 
The brief questioning of the defendant regarding the 
unidentified individual seen leaning into the 
defendant's vehicle did not exceed the scope of the 
initial traffic stop in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment. Such brief questioning was reasonable and 
based on the officer[f]s personal observation and 
suspicion that the defendant was engaged in other 
criminal activity such as drugs or prostitution. 
R.84-85. The trial court erred in concluding that the officer 
did not exceed the legitimate scope of the traffic stop. See 
Chevre, 2000 UT App 6, 11 8-9. 
First, the stop exceeded its legitimate scope because 
Swensen's questioning was not necessary to "'effectuate1" it. 
Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132 (quotation omitted). "As to length of a 
permissible detention, the [U.S. Supreme] Court has held that the 
detention 'must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary 
to effectuate the purpose of the stop.'" State v. Fiaueroa-
Solorio, 830 P.2d 276, 280 (Utah App. 1992) (quoting Florida v. 
Rover, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983)) 
(emphasis added). Swensen testified that the investigative 
questioning concerning Mr. Warren's pre-traffic violation 
activity was unrelated to and unnecessary to effectuate the stop. 
R.130[18]. Hence, by Swensen's own admission, the stop violated 
the Fourth Amendment since the questioning was unrelated to the 
stop and prolonged the detention beyond the time "'necessary to 
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effectuate [its] purpose.1" Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132 (quotation 
omitted); see also Rover, 460 U.S. at 280-81. 
The fact that the questioning lasted one or two minutes, or 
that it occurred during an ongoing traffic stop, does not remedy 
the violation. R.130[18]. The length of the delay caused by 
investigative questioning, or whether it occurs during an on-
going stop, alone are not dispositive of reasonableness; 
reasonable suspicion arises only when other suspicious 
circumstances accompany those facts. See Fiqueroa-Solorio, 830 
P.2d at 280-81 (fact that questioning during stop for jay walking 
lasted two or three minutes was only one factor going toward 
reasonableness; other factor included permissible warrants check 
revealing outstanding warrant for defendant's arrest); State v. 
O'Brien, 959 P.2d 647, 649 (Utah App. 1998) (fact that inspection 
of car occurred during ongoing traffic stop, in addition to 
defendant's "furtive movements," "questionable explanation," and 
"admission" that he had weapon, justified added detention). 
"[R]ather than focusing solely on the length of the detention, 
this court has held there is no ''bright line rule as to the 
acceptable length of a detention because 'common sense and 
ordinary human experience must govern over rigid criteria.''1" 
State v. Ottesen, 920 P.2d 183, 185 (Utah App. 1996) (quotations 
omitted). 
The ultimate inquiry goes to the reasonableness of the 
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questioning under the totality of the circumstances, for "even a 
small intrusion beyond the legitimate scope of an initially 
lawful search is unlawful under the Fourth Amendment." State v. 
Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132, 1135 (Utah 1989) (citing Arizona v. 
Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325, 107 S.Ct. 1149, 94 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987)) 
(mere opening of car door exceeded legitimate scope of traffic 
stop). This Court's decision in State v. Matison, 875 P.2d 584 
(Utah App. 1994), is instructive on the issue of reasonableness 
in this case and compels the conclusion that Swensen's 
questioning went beyond the legal scope of the traffic stop. 
In Matison, the officer observed defendant "fishtail while 
exiting the interstate." Id. at 585. He then saw defendant stop 
at a nearby convenience store. Id. The officer 
drove to the area where the incident had occurred and 
determined that it was not the result of hazardous road 
conditions. However, he did nothing more concerning 
the incident even though he was aware of defendant's 
location; instead, he proceeded away from the site of 
the incident. He later stopped defendant only because, 
by mere happenstance, defendant was traveling in the 
same direction as [the officer]. 
Id. at 587. The officer "testified that he decided to stop the 
vehicle [at that point] to determine whether the driver was 
impaired or why the driver was unable to control the vehicle 
while exiting the interstate [earlier]." Id. at 586. 
The Court held the stop was not "f'justified at its 
inception1f" because it was not premised on a legitimate traffic 
violation nor a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity 
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occurring at the time of the stop. Id. at 587 (quoting Lopez, 
873 P.2d at 1132 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20)). In so 
holding, he Court reasoned that although the officer 
testified that he stopped the defendant to determine 
whether he was impaired or why he was unable to control 
the vehicle at the interchange . . . , defendant 
clearly would not have been stopped had he proceeded by 
another route. Had [the officer] continued to 
investigate the incident after determining that it was 
not caused by road conditions, rather than expressly 
abandoning further investigation by proceeding away 
from defendant, the stop may have been justified. 
Instead, he drove away from Salina and defendant with 
no apparent intention of stopping him. 
Id. at 587 (emphasis added). 
The facts of the present case parallel those in Matison and 
similarly highlight that Officer Swensen's questioning was not 
grounded in a "reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal 
activity . . . based on specific, articulable facts drawn from 
the totality of the circumstances facing the officer at the time 
of the stop." Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132. Like the officer in 
Matison, Swensen did not stop Mr. Warren on account of the 
activity that he observed prior to the traffic stop. R.130[16]. 
Rather, he let him drive on "with no apparent intention of 
stopping him." Matison, 875 P.2d at 587. Swensen stopped Mr. 
Warren only after he observed him make a left turn and a lane 
change without signaling. R.130[6-7]. But for the mere 
"happenstance" of the subsequent traffic violations, Mr. Warren 
"clearly would not have been stopped" and questioned about his 
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exchange with the unidentified individual. Matison, 875 P.2d at 
587. 
Moreover, the investigative questioning was not justified by 
any additional information that came to light after Swensen 
initiated the stop. "[I]nvestigative questioning that detains 
the driver beyond the scope of the initial stop . . . 'must be 
supported by reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal 
activity . . . based on specific articulable facts drawn from the 
totality of the circumstances facing the officer at the time of 
the stop. '" Chevre, 2000 UT App at 1 10 (quoting Lopez, 873 P.2d 
at 1132) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Holt, Case 
No. 99-7150 (10th Cir. 2000) (officer, during traffic stop, 
impermissibly asked defendant about weapons where "questions . . 
. [were not] precipitated by reasonable suspicion"). 
"'[Alt the time of th[is] stop,1" Chevre, 2000 UT App, 1 9 
(quoting Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132), Swensen only testified that 
Mr. Warren pulled over without incident, and willingly and 
readily gave over his driver's license and vehicle registration 
upon request. R.130[8]. Swensen did not offer any other 
articulable facts giving rise to a reasonable suspicion of drug 
or prostitution related activity that would justify the 
subsequent questioning, such as furtive movements or evasiveness 
in a known crime area, see O'Brien, 959 P.2d at 649 (visual 
inspection of vehicle did not exceed scope of traffic stop where 
14 
officer viewed defendant furtively bend over several times while 
pulling over); State v. Holmes, 774 P.2d 506, 508-09 (Utah App. 
198 9) (stop legal under Fourth Amendment where defendant was seen 
driving evasively through area known for prostitution), or 
incoherence or nervousness on Mr. Warren's part. See Chevre, 
2000 UT App at SI 9 (officer legally extended scope of traffic 
stop where defendant was incoherent and so nervous that he could 
not stop bouncing his foot on car floor). Accordingly, like 
Matison, Swensen did not have a reasonable suspicion to prolong 
the traffic stop with investigative questioning about previous 
activity that did not form the basis of the stop in the first 
place. See. 875 P.2d at 587. 
In light of the foregoing, the trial court erred in 
concluding that Swensen!s questioning of Mr. Warren did not 
exceed the legitimate scope of the traffic stop, and in 
consequently failing to suppress the evidence seized. See 
Chevre, 2000 UT App at flfl 8-10 (citing Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132); 
Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655. The questioning was not necessary to 
effectuate the purposes of the stop. Id. Additionally, Officer 
Swensen did not have reasonable suspicion to question defendant 
about activity that occurred prior to the traffic stop, and none 
of the facts "at the time of the stop" gave rise to a reasonable 
suspicion justifying the questioning. Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132. 
Accordingly, the stop violated Mr. Warren's Fourth Amendment 
right against unreasonable search and seizure. See U.S. Const. 
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amend. IV; see also Utah Const. Art. I, § 14. 
B. The Trial Court Erred in Concluding That the Terry 
Frisk Was Reasonable Under the Fourth Amendment. 
The United States Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio held: 
where a police officer observes unusual conduct which 
leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his 
experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that 
the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and 
presently dangerous, where in the course of 
investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a 
policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where 
nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves 
to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others1 
safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself 
and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited 
search of the outer clothing of such persons in an 
attempt to discover weapons which might be used to 
assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search 
under the Fourth Amendment, and any weapons seized may 
properly be introduced in evidence against the person 
from whom they were taken. 
392 U.S. at 30-31; see also Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-16 (1999) 
(statutory authorization for Terry frisk). 
Terry further notes: 
[t]he officer need not be absolutely certain that the 
individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably 
prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in 
the belief that his safety or that of others was in 
danger. Cf. Beck v. State of Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 
S.Ct. 223, 226, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964); Brineaar v. 
United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174-176, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 
1311, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949); Stacev v. Emery, 97 U.S. 
642, 645, 24 L.Ed. 1035 (1878). And in determining 
whether the officer acted reasonably in such 
circumstances, due weight must be given, not to his 
inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or fhunch,' but 
to the specific reasonable inferences which he is 
entitled to draw from the facts in light of his 
experience. Cf. Brineaar[, 338 U.S. at 174-76.] 
Id. at 27 (noting in footnote 23 to this excerpt that 
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"specificity in the information upon which police action is 
predicated is the central teaching of this Court's Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence" (citations omitted)). 
In light of the foregoing, the trial court erred in 
upholding the frisk and stop of Mr. Warren. As an initial 
matter, the patdown cannot be justified on the basis that Swensen 
frisks every suspect as a matter of routine. R.130[10]. "The 
1
 narrow scope1 of the Terry exception does not permit a frisk for 
weapons on less than a reasonable belief or suspicion directed at 
the person to be frisked." Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 94, 
100 S.Ct. 338, 62 L.Ed.2d 238 (1979) (emphasis added). A 
generalized routine is the exact opposite of the particularized 
suspicion required by the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 93-94. 
Indeed, on this premise, the U.S. Supreme Court in Ybarra 
reversed an order allowing evidence seized during a generalized 
protective frisk under analogous circumstances to those of the 
case at bar. 444 U.S. at 96. In Ybarra, the defendant was a 
patron in a bar where the bartender was being searched under 
warrant for heroin. Id. at 88-89. The searching officers 
announced that they would "conduct a 'cursory search for 
weapons'" on the patrons in the bar as well. Id. at 88. Heroine 
was found on the defendant as a result of the general frisk. Id. 
at 89. 
In reversing the lower court's ruling, the Supreme Court 
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noted that there was no individualized suspicion that the 
defendant was armed or dangerous, and that his "mere propinquity 
to others suspected of criminal activity" did not support the 
frisk. Id. at 91, 93. The Court noted that the officers, 
neither recognized him as a person with a criminal 
history nor had any particular reason to believe that 
he might be inclined to assault them. Moreover, as 
Police Agent Johnson later testified, Ybarra, whose 
hands were empty, gave no indication of possessing a 
weapon, made no gestures or other actions indicative of 
an intent to commit an assault, and acted generally in 
a manner that was not threatening. At the suppression 
hearing, the most Agent Johnson could point to was that 
Ybarra was wearing a 3/4-length lumber jacket, 
clothing which the State admits could be expected on 
almost any tavern patron in Illinois in early March. 
In short, the State is unable to articulate any 
specific fact that would have justified a police 
officer at the scene in even suspecting that Ybarra was 
armed and dangerous. 
Id. at 93. 
As in Ybarra, nothing in the findings of fact from the court 
or the testimony of Officer Swensen establishes that the frisk of 
Mr. Warren was "supported by a reasonable belief that he [in 
particular] was armed and presently dangerous, a belief which 
this Court has invariably held must form the predicate to a 
patdown of a person for weapons." Id. at 92-93 (citing Adams v. 
Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612; 
Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-24). The lower court made the following 
findings in this regard: 
The brief "Terry" frisk of defendant for weapons was 
not conducted in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 
Even though the officer stated he did not believe the 
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defendant had weapons, the search was supported by an 
objective reasonable suspicion that defendant was armed 
and dangerous. The search was only conducted for 
officer safety and was supported by the following 
facts: the lateness of the hour, the area, no other 
traffic, no residences in area or open business, 
defendant's odd and inconsistent explanation of his 
activities, [the] officer[f]s belief defendant was 
engaged in drugs or prostitution and that people who 
engage in such activity usually carry weapons, the 
officer was alone, the officer was going to impound 
defendant's vehicle, and defendant's previous false 
statement about the status of his license. 
R.84-85; see Addendum B (Written Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law). 
First, the frisk was not supported by the officer's belief 
that individuals suspected of drug or prostitution related 
activity are usually armed given the nature of their crime. 
R.84-85. If the suspected crime is one of violence, then an 
officer may frisk without any more knowledge of the suspect. See 
Wayne R. LeFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise On the Fourth 
Amendment § 9.5(a), at 254-60. 
This includes such suspected offenses as robbery, 
burglary, rape, assault with weapons, homicide and 
dealing in large quantities of narcotics. In such 
circumstances, then, "the officer's reasonable belief 
may derive as much from his experience in similar cases 
as from his precise knowledge of the dangerous 
propensities of the suspect at hand." 
Id. at 255-56 (footnotes and quotation omitted) (emphasis added); 
see e.g., Terry, 392 U.S. at 28 (frisk permissible where officer 
suspected defendant was involved in a "daylight robbery - which, 
it is reasonable to assume, would be likely to involve the use of 
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weapons"); see also State v. Dorsev, 731 P.2d 1085, 1092 (Utah 
1986) (Zimmerman, J., concurring) (noting that officer might 
reasonably frisk people suspected of dealing large quantities of 
illegal drugs over long distances because they "might be armed to 
protect themselves from criminals who might attempt to frip-off! 
a drug dealer"). 
But for other types of crimes, such as trafficking in 
small quantities of narcotics, possession of marijuana, 
illegal possession of liquor, prostitution, bookmaking, 
shoplifting, underage drinking, driving under the 
influence and lesser traffic offenses, minor assault 
without weapons, or vagrancy, as well as when the stop 
is for a legitimate noncriminal reason, there must be, 
as Justice Harlan noted in Terry, "other circumstances" 
present. 
LeFave, § 9.5(a) at 256-57 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 34) 
(Harlan, J., concurring); see, e.g., State v. White, 856 P.2d 
656, 665 (Utah App. 1993) ("balancing defendant's right to be 
free of unreasonable interference against the police officers1 
right to protect themselves or others weighs against validating 
an automatic frisk based on [suspected] . . . cocaine use. 
Cocaine use is not a crime of violence comparable to dealing in 
large quantities of drugs"). 
In the present case, Swensen only testified generally that 
he suspected Mr. Warren of being involved in drugs or 
prostitution. R.130[6-7]. Prostitution, as noted by LeFave, is 
not the sort of violent crime giving rise to a reasonable 
suspicion of weapons. See LeFave, § 9.5(a) at 255-56. As to 
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Swensenfs suspicion of drugs, he did not articulate whether he 
thought Mr. Warren was a large scale dealer, or simply involved 
in a small transaction. Although the substances subsequently 
found on Mr. Warren were later identified in the Probable Cause 
Statement as Methamphetamine and Cocaine, R.16, Swensen's 
testimony did not specify what kind of drugs he thought Mr. 
Warren was involved in. See generally R.130[3-22]. Such a 
paucity of testimony regarding the nature of the suspected 
criminal activity does not rise to the level of "articulable 
facts" necessary to establish a "rationale inference []" that Mr. 
Warren was armed, justifying the frisk of his person. Terry, 392 
U.S. at 21 (warning against "intrusions upon constitutionally 
guaranteed rights based on nothing more substantial than 
inarticulate hunches") (citing Beck v. Ohio, 364 U.S. 253, 80 
S.Ct. 1431, 4 L.Ed.2d 1688 (1960); Henry v. United States, 361 
U.S. 98, 80 S.Ct. 168, 4 L.Ed.2d 134 (1959)). 
In addition, Swensen did not articulate anything else about 
Mr. Warren that supported a reasonable suspicion justifying a 
frisk. Swensen did not articulate that there were any suspicious 
bulges on Mr. Warren indicating a weapon, or that he had his hand 
in his pocket as if to pull one. See State v. Rochelle, 850 P.2d 
480, 483 (Utah App. 1993) (upholding frisk where defendant "had a 
bulge in his pocket"); see United States v. Michelletti, 13 F.3d 
838, 842 (5th Cir. 1994) (defendant kept right hand in pocket, 
"precisely where a weapon could be located," even when he opened 
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door and even though he had a beer in other hand). Swensen also 
did not state that Mr. Warren behaved in an evasive or 
threatening manner, or that backed away as if to draw a weapon. 
See Rochelle, 850 P.2d at 483 ("when asked whether he had any 
weapons, [defendant] 'was hesitant in answering no 1"); see also 
United States v. Rideau, 969 F.2d 1572 (5th Cir. 1992) (stressing 
defendant's "moves took place after a detention, at night, in a 
high crime area where the carrying of weapons is common"). 
If anything, Swensenfs testimony establishes that Mr. 
Warren's demeanor and the surrounding circumstances did not 
reasonably suggest a risk of harm. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. 
First, Swensen himself testified that he did not believe Mr. 
Warren was armed at the point he decided to frisk him. 
R.130 [20]. Hence, the sole justification for the "narrowly 
drawn" exception carved out under Terry - "to permit a reasonable 
search for weapons for the protection of the police officer" - is 
not present. 392 U.S. at 27. Indeed, by Swensen!s own 
testimony, the necessity for a weapons frisk dissipated before he 
conducted the patdown in that he had already concluded in his 
mind that Mr. Warren did not present a threat. R.130[20]. This 
alone compels the conclusion that the need for the search did not 
outweigh Mr. Warren's right to be free of such unwarranted 
intrusion. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 ("there is 'no ready test 
for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need 
to search (or seize) against the invasion which the search (or 
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seizure) entails1") (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 
523, 536-37, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967)). 
Swensen's own belief that Mr. Warren was not armed or 
dangerous likewise renders other factors cited by the trial court 
as unreasonable bases for upholding the frisk. "[T]he lateness 
of the hour, the area, no other traffic, no residences in area or 
open business, [Mr. Warren's] odd and inconsistent explanation of 
his activities, officer[f]s belief [that] defendant was engaged 
in drugs or prostitution and that people who engage in such 
activity usually carry weapons, the officer was alone, the 
officer was going to impound defendant's vehicle, and defendant's 
previous false statement about the status of his license," R.84, 
all occurred prior to Swensen's conclusion that Mr. Warren was 
not a threat. Hence, the frisk was not justified because 
"[c]ircumstances allowed [Swensen] time to reassess [his 
suspicions] of criminal activity and [his] initial suspicions of 
danger without being subjected to 'unnecessary risks in the 
performance of [his] duties.'" State v. White, 856 P.2d 656, 666 
(Utah App. 1993) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 23). 
Additional factors testified to by Swensen underscore the 
unreasonableness of the frisk. For example, Swensen stated that 
Mr. Warren pulled over quickly and without incident, got out of 
the car willingly to sign his citation, cooperated by giving over 
his license readily, and answered his questions about the expired 
license and his pre-stop activity without protest. R.130[17-19]; 
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see White, 856 P.2d at 666 (holding frisk unconstitutional where 
defendant "was cooperative and mellow and followed directions 
without protest"). Swensen further testified that Mr. Warren 
simply sat in his car while Swensen stepped away to check his 
license, and did not otherwise behave in any suspicious manner 
indicating that he was a threat. R.130[19]; see Ybarra, 444 U.S. 
at 93 (noting that defendant "made no gestures or other actions 
indicative of an intent to commit an assault, and generally 
[acted] in a manner that was not threatening"). Swensen also 
testified that he did not recognize Mr. Warren as a criminal 
known for his violent propensity. R.130[15]; see Ybarra, 444 
U.S. at 93 (noting that officers did not "recognize[ defendant] 
as a person with a criminal history"); State v. Rovbal, 716 P.2d 
291, 293 (Utah 1986) (upholding frisk of defendant who "had been 
arrested in conjunction with [an] earlier shooting incident" that 
occurred the same day). 
In light of the foregoing, the "undisputed facts indicatfe] 
that the need for a frisk had dissipated" at the point that 
Officer Swensen decided to pat down Mr. Warren for weapons. 
White, 856 P.2d at 666. Accordingly, the trial court erred in 
upholding the frisk as lawful under the Fourth Amendment and in 
failing to suppress the evidence illegally seized as a result. 
Id.; Terry, 392 P.2d at 30; Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655. 
II. THE STOP CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED UNDER THE INEVITABLE 
DISCOVERY DOCTRINE. 
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The State argued below that the evidence should not be 
suppressed because it would inevitably have been discovered. 
R.131[13]. The State asserted the following: 
The officer's testimony was that he was going to 
impound the car, and at that point the defendant would 
be free to leave however he wished after he'd signed 
the citation. However, they'd already started the 
impoundment procedure, and the officer was waiting for 
back-up to come help him do that. 
Once they started searching the car, they would 
have found the weapon under the passenger's side 
armrest, to which the defendant was charged with. Then 
once they found that concealed, dangerous weapon, they 
would have going and looked for the defendant, wherever 
he was, and the arrested him based on the discovery of 
that concealed weapon. Once they arrested him for that 
reason, they would have searched his person, they would 
have found the drugs that they would have discovered 
during the frisk. 
So I think under the law as long as they're 
pursuing the means which would have inevitably 
discovered the evidence, they're justified in doing 
that. 
Id. The court did not rule on this aspect of the court's 
argument. R.8 4-85. 
The inevitable discovery doctrine, an exception to the 
exclusionary rule, was adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Nix 
v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 441, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 81 L.Ed.2d 377 
(1984). The Nix Court stated: 
It is clear that the cases implementing the 
exclusionary rule "begin with the premise that the 
challenged evidence is in some sense the product of 
illegal governmental activity." United States v. 
Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 471, 100 S.Ct. 1244, 63 L.Ed.2d 
537 (1980). Of course, this does not end the inquiry. 
If the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of 
the evidence that the information ultimately or 
inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means 
. . the deterrence rationale has so little basis that 
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the evidence should be received. 
Id. at 444. 
Recognizing that "[t]his [C]ourt may affirm a lower court's 
ruling on any alternative ground ''even though that ground or 
theory was not identified by the lower court as the basis of its 
ruling,11" Dipoma v. McPhie, 2000 UT App 130, 1 4, 1 P.3d 564 
(quotations omitted), this Court should refrain from affirming 
the lower court's admission of the evidence seized from Mr. 
Warren under the inevitable discovery doctrine; it is 
inapplicable because the State did not present any evidentiary 
basis for applying the doctrine, and the facts adduced at the 
suppression hearing do not otherwise establish by a preponderance 
of the evidence that the drugs "'would1 have been discovered," 
State ex rel. M.V., 1999 UT App 12, fl 12, 997 P.2d 494 (citation 
omitted), such that "the evidence is absolved of the taint" of 
prior illegal police conduct. State v. James, 1999 UT App 17, f 
18, 977 P.2d 489. 
A. The State Did Not Present Any Evidentiary Basis 
Establishing the Existence of an Alleged Gun or Any 
Other Weapon. 
As to the State's preponderance burden and the quality of 
evidence that must be presented, Nix explained that proof of 
"inevitable discovery involves no speculative elements but 
focuses on demonstrated historical facts capable of ready 
verification or impeachment." Nix, 467 U.S. at 444 n.5. This 
quality of evidence would "not require a departure from the usual 
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burden of proof [by a preponderance of the evidence] at 
suppression hearings." Id. The State did not meet its burden of 
proof because it never presented any testimony at the suppression 
hearing about the alleged gun or other evidence that otherwise 
supplied an adequate evidentiary basis for applying the 
inevitable discovery doctrine. Id. 
First, the searching officer never testified about a gun or 
any other weapon at either of the two suppression hearings held 
in this case. See generally R.130[3-22], 131. Swensen, who 
testified at the February 18, 2000, suppression hearing only, 
R.130, merely stated during cross-examination that found a "white 
plastic twist," i.e. drugs. R.130[20]. The State did not elicit 
any testimony concerning contraband of any sort during its direct 
examination of Swensen, let alone testimony about weapons in 
general or a gun in particular. R.130[3-ll]. In the absence of 
such testimony, it cannot be said that the evidence is "capable 
of ready verification or impeachment." Nix, 4 67 U.S. at n.5. 
Indeed, the alleged gun is not subject to any verification or 
cross-examination by either this Court or Mr. Warren. Id. 
The only reference to an alleged gun was made by the 
prosecutor at the suppression hearing on March 20, 2000. R.131. 
He did not brief the issue as he "forgot to point it out in [his] 
memorandum," R.131[12], and he only made the statement at the 
close of his argument in favor of admitting the drug evidence at 
issue. R.131[13]. The prosecutor's statements concerning a gun 
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do not satisfy the Nix standard, however, for they are merely 
argument and not properly characterized as "facts capable of 
ready verification or impeachment." Nix, 4 67 U.S. at n.5. 
The only other mention of a dangerous weapon of any sort is 
in the Information and accompanying Probable Cause Statement. 
R.14-16. The reference is not to the gun alleged by the State. 
Count III of the Information alleges that Mr. Warren, "did carry 
a concealed dangerous weapon which is not a firearm on his 
person, or one that was readily accessible for immediate use, 
which was not securely encased, in a place other than his 
residence, property, or business under his control." R.15. The 
Probable Cause Statement alleges: 
[t]he statement of Officer S. Wozab that he assisted 
Officer Swensen in searching the defendant's vehicle. 
Underneath the armrest on the front seat, the Officers 
located a knife, two additional pipes, filters, and a 
pen tube with residue. 
R.16. Like the prosecutor's statement, however, such evidence is 
not the quality of proof necessary under Nix since it is only an 
unproved allegation made unilaterally by the State rather than a 
"fact[] capable of ready verification or impeachment.'' 4 67 U.S. 
at n.5.2 
Aside from the unclear nature of the alleged weapon found 
in Mr. Warren's car, there is nothing in the State's evidence to 
establish by a preponderance standard that Mr. Warren carried a 
"concealed dangerous weapon" in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 
76-10-504 (1999), such that his arrest and subsequent search 
would have inevitably followed. See Nix, 467 U.S. at 444. 
Section 76-10-504 (1) (a) prohibits the carrying of "a 
concealed dangerous weapon, as defined in Section 76-10-501 
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[(1999)], which is not a firearm on his person or one that is 
readily accessible for immediate use which is not securely 
encased, as defined in this part, in a place other than his 
residence, property, or business under his control." Except 
under the circumstances outlined in 76-10-504 (1) (a), Utah 
citizens have a constitutional right to carry a gun. See U.S. 
Const, amend. II (Right to Bear Arms); Utah Const. Art. I, § 6 
(same). 
Assuming for the sake of argument only that the State 
established that a gun was located in Mr. Warren's car, it failed 
to establish any evidence that it was carried in violation of 76-
10-504. The State did not present any evidence establishing that 
the gun was the sort prohibited by law, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-
10-501(8) ("[f]irearm" means a pistol, revolver, shotgun, 
sawed-off shotgun, rifle or sawed-off rifle, or any device that 
could be used as a dangerous weapon from which is expelled a 
projectile by action of an explosive") & 76-10-501(11) 
("[h]andgun" means a pistol, revolver, or other firearm of any 
description, loaded or unloaded, from which any shot, bullet, or 
other missile can be discharged, the length of which, not 
including any revolving, detachable, or magazine breech, does not 
exceed 12 inches"); or that it was loaded and not properly 
encased, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-501(1)(b) ("[a] dangerous 
weapon shall not be .considered a concealed dangerous weapon if it 
is a firearm which is unloaded and is securely encased"). 
Also assuming for the sake of argument only that the State 
established the presence of a knife, it similarly failed to 
establish any evidence that it was possessed in violation of 76-
10-504. For example, nothing in the evidence establishes whether 
the knife was a small pocket knife unlikely to cause serious 
injury or death, or something more significant in size and 
potential for harm which would qualify it as a "dangerous 
weapon." See. Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-501(4) (a) ("[d]angerous 
weapon" means any item that in the manner of its use or intended 
use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury. The 
following factors shall be used in determining whether a knife, 
or any other item, object, or thing not commonly known'as a 
dangerous weapon is a dangerous weapon: (i) the character of the 
instrument, object, or thing; (ii) the character of the wound 
produced, if any; (iii) the manner in which the instrument, 
object, or thing was used; and (iv) the other lawful purposes 
for which the instrument, object, or thing may be used"); see 
also State v. Puamire, 898 P.2d 271 (Utah App. 1995), cert, 
denied 910 P.2d 425 (Utah 1995) (defendant's knife, which was 
about 9 *s inches long including 4 H inch blade, was dangerous 
weapon under 76-10-504). 
Whether a gun or a knife, the State further failed to 
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In short, the State did not present "demonstrated historical 
facts capable of ready verification,'' Nix, 467 U.S. at 444 n.5, 
due to the inconsistency between the State's argument at the 
suppression hearing alleging the presence of a gun, R.131[13], 
the Information's reference to a "concealed dangerous weapon 
which is not a firearm," R.15, the Probable Cause Statement's 
reference to a "knife," R.16, and the absence of any testimony 
concerning a gun or weapon from Swensen, R.130[3-22]. See Nix, 
467 U.S. at 444. Indeed, it failed to even identify the alleged 
weapon. At best, the allegation of a dangerous weapon is 
establish any evidence establishing that weapon was "concealed 
and "dangerous," see Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-501(1)(a) ("concealed 
dangerous weapon" means a dangerous weapon that is covered, 
hidden, or secreted in a manner that the public would not be 
aware of its presence and is readily accessible for immediate 
use"); that it was "readily accessible for immediate use," see 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-501(14) (if [r] eadily accessible for 
immediate use" means that a firearm or other dangerous weapon is 
carried on the person or within such close proximity and in such 
a manner that it can be retrieved and used as readily as if 
carried on the person"); not "securely encased," see Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-10-501(17) ("[s]ecurely encased" means not readily 
accessible for immediate use, such as held in a gun rack, or in a 
closed case or container, whether or not locked, or in a trunk or 
other storage area of a motor vehicle, not including a glove box 
or console box"); or that it was kept in an illegal place, see 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-504(1)(a) (prohibiting carrying concealed 
dangerous weapon in "place other than [defendant's] residence, 
property, or business under his control"). 
Where the State failed to present any "demonstrated 
historical facts capable of ready verification or impeachment," 
Nix, 468 U.S. at n.5, regarding whether Mr. Warren carried a 
"concealed dangerous weapon" in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-
10-504, it did not meet its preponderance burden of proof. 
Accordingly, there is no evidentiary basis for the application of 
the inevitable discovery doctrine. See Nix, 467 U.S. at 444. 
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"speculative," and does not rise to the preponderance standard 
required at suppression hearings. Id. at n.5. Hence, the State 
did not present an adequate evidentiary basis for the application 
of the inevitable discovery doctrine. Id. 
B. The Evidence Presented by the State Does Not 
Otherwise Establish That the Drugs Inevitably Would 
Have Been Discovered. 
In addition to the foregoing, the inevitable discovery 
doctrine does not apply because the evidence presented by the 
State does not otherwise establish that the drugs "'would1 have 
been discovered." State ex rel. M.V. , 1999 UT App 12, SI 12 
(citation omitted). 
The State asserted below that, after discovering the gun in 
the course of the inventory search incident to the impound of Mr. 
Warren's vehicle, Mr. Warren would have been arrested on the 
basis of the allegedly concealed gun. R.131[13]. The State 
opined that the drugs would have been discovered on Mr. Warren's 
person during the search incident to arrest. Id. Such a 
speculative leap as to what might have happened, however, does 
not "absolve[]" the illegally seized evidence of the "taint" 
caused by the violation of Mr. Warren's Fourth Amendment rights. 
James, 1999 UT App 17, f 18; see supra Points I.A. and I.B. 
The State's argument fails because it tenuously assumes that 
the drugs found on Mr. Warren during the illegal frisk would 
still be on him by the time the officers had inventoried the car, 
found the alleged gun, and then decided to arrest and search him. 
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Common sense and Swensen's testimony, however, dictate a more 
likely scenario, where Mr. Warren would have disposed of the 
small twist before the officers got around to arresting and 
searching him. For example, Swensen testified that he did not 
intend to arrest Mr. Warren on the traffic citations after he 
decided to impound his car. R.130[22]. This means that Mr. 
Warren was free to wander around, even leave, the site of the 
stop while Swensen was preoccupied with the inventory search. 
This would give Mr. Warren ample opportunity to dispose of the 
twist. Indeed, such a small item could covertly and easily be 
cast out of sight (i.e. into bushes, in the gutter, behind a 
building or car) without detection by the officers. The fact 
that it was not daylight at the time of the stop would have 
served as additional cover for Mr. Warren. R.130[5]. By the 
time the officers got around to arresting and searching him for 
the alleged gun, he would no longer have any contraband on his 
person. 
Mr. Warren's opportunity to discard the twist and, 
consequently, it's uncertain discovery, distinguishes this case 
from State ex rel M.V., 1999 UT App 104, wherein this Court 
upheld the admission of a knife under the inevitable discovery 
doctrine. Id. at SI 13. In that case, an officer stopped M.V., a 
juvenile, as he walked with another juvenile male through a high 
crime area at 11:30 a.m. on a school day. Id. at SI 2. M.V.'s 
companion ran off. Id. M.V. had his hands in his pockets. Id. 
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at SI 3. The officer frisked M.V. and found a package of 
cigarettes. Id. The officer asked M.V. if he had anything else; 
M.V. responded that he had a knife tucked in his pants. Id. 
M.V. then gave puzzling explanations as to why he was not in 
school. Id. at 1 4. Because of his responses, the officer 
"called dispatch to verify M.V.fs name and status, and learned of 
a juvenile pick-up order on M.V. Upon receiving this 
information, the officer took M.V. into custody and transported 
him to the Youth Detention Center." Id. at 1 5. 
On appeal, the State conceded it was "a close call as to 
whether a Terry frisk [was] justified." Id. at 5 11. It argued, 
however, and this Court agreed, that the evidence was admissible 
under the inevitable discovery doctrine. Id. This Court 
reasoned that "[u]pon his arrival at youth detention, M.V. would 
routinely be searched in accordance with the administrative 
rules [,] . . . a separate independent investigation that 
inevitably would have led to the discovery of the knife hidden in 
M.V.!s pants." Id. at 5 13. 
The inventory search of Mr. Warren's car does not amount to 
the same sort of "independent investigation that inevitably would 
have led to the discovery of" the twist hidden in his clothing. 
Id. (emphasis added). Unlike Mr. Warren, M.V. never had an 
opportunity to discard the knife since the officer's attention 
was focused on him during the entire encounter up until the 
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discovery of the knife. Id. at flfl 2-3. The knife had already 
been discovered at the time that the officer diverted his 
attention to call dispatch. Id. at ffl 3-5. Therefore, the 
discovery of M.V.fs knife was truly "inevitable" and its 
admission would not nullify Fourth Amendment safeguards. See 
Nix, 467 U.S. at 443 (balancing "interest of society in deterring 
unlawful police conduct and the public interest in having juries 
receive all probative evidence of a crime"). 
In light of the foregoing, discovery of the twist cannot be 
said to be "inevitable." See Nix, 467 U.S. at 444. At best, the 
State's argument only speculatively suggests that it "'could1 or 
'might' have been discovered" assuming that Mr. Warren would take 
no action at all to dispose of the contraband. State ex rel 
M.V., 1999 UT App 104, f 12 (citation omitted). This does not 
satisfy the State's preponderance burden. See Nix, 467 U.S. at 
444. Consequently, the inevitable discovery doctrine does not 
apply in this case. Id. Indeed, application of the doctrine to 
the present situation "would swallow the exclusionary rule by 
weakening the rule's [deterrent] effect." James, 1999 UT App 17, 
f 18 (citation omitted); see also Nix, 467 U.S. at 442-43. 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the foregoing, Mr. Warren respectfully requests 
this Court to reverse the lower court's order admitting the 
evidence unconstitutionally seized from his person in violation 
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of his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and A m c i e 
RESPECTFULLY submitted LI^O X^^X ad} ,. i SeptemDer, 2 'CO. 
l , j, -^  
CATHERINE E. LILLY 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, CATHERINE E. LILLY, hereby cer:i:\ that T have rau.^d +•-
be hand-delivered ten copies of the ^^r^^^^rn * *'• *ih :r-eme 
Court, 450 South State Street, Salt ^ .• . ... ; .... ,..-,. ,::d 
four copies to the Utah Attorney General's of*]"p. Hop- *-;Is 
Building, 160 East 300 South, Third 
Lake City, Utah 84114-0854, this Jtf_&;_ -d\ -- September, 2000. 
% ^^aOcui r , . UU 
CATHERINE E. LILLY tr 
. ':.]. '. VERE L" r- ' - f '• -.r r"oi;r* f Apr^P. : ^  ana t.he L''-^ 1- Attorney 





IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
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Q 1 he motion of to enter" a judgement of convictior i for the next lower category of offense and 
impose sentence accordingly in • granted Q jenied There being no legal or other reason why sentence 
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted by • a jury; • the court, A plea of guilty; 
• plea of no contest; of the offense of _ , a felony 
of the yf^ degree, • a cla^s misdemeanor, being now present in court and ready for sentence and 
represented by t) ^TZAJU ^U - rand the State being represented by ^ U/I4f&\ghcw adjudged guilty 
of the above offense, is now senfehced to a. term in the Utah State Prison: 
• to a maximum mandatory term of years and wl lich may be life; 
¥ j not to exceed five years; 
I • of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years; 
• of not less than five years and which may be for life; 
• not to exceed years; 
• and ordered to pay a fine in the amount ot $ ; 
• and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $ _., to _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
• sucn sentence is IO run concurrently witn
 ; 
A such sentence is to run consecutively with (Sirf^QA ( f^ D/) 
Q upon motion of • State, Q Defense, Q Court, Court(s) are hereby dismissed. 
• 
• Defendant is granted a stay of above ( • prison ) sentence and placed on probation in the custody of 
this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent Utah State Department of Adult Parole for the 
period of , pursuant to the attached conditions of probation. 
L II Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County • for delivery to the 
Utah State Prison, Draper, Utah, or • for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where.defendant shall be 
confined and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment' 
( I Commitment shall issue 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COT JRT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMEN I 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
PI an il iff, 
I' S 
ER IC I AR\ IS W ARREN, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OFF AC l .\ 
CONCLUSIONS OF T * 
Case No S ^ U V ^ J J M ^ S 
Judge Mi l l eve 
1 he above-entitled ease came before this Coin t on h Liu li JJ, H H H I „ _
 r 
defendant's motion to suppress evidence !he State of Utah was represented H\ ?TS row ^** 
David E. Yocom and, Matthew G, Nielsen, and the defendant was represented by Otis Sterling. 
1 had previously taken testimonial evidence on defendant's motion to suppress evidence 
on February 18, 200u. Inerefore, this Court hereby mak.es the following findings of fact and 
cnik. luMnns o f Lis ».' 
FINDINGS OF F \ 
1) At approxm • -* ,.,<: 
the Salt Lake City Police Department was on general patrol duties in the area of 350 East and 
200 South, when he noticed a car stopped the side of the road at abot .:>outh and 200 East. 
< 
2) The car was occupied and driven by the defendant. Officer Swensen saw an 
unidentified individual leaning partially into the open passenger side door and then shut the door 
and walk away as the vehicle drove off. Officer Swensen never saw the unidentified individual 
inside of the car and had no reason to believe he was a passenger. 
3) Officer Swensen was suspicious that a drug deal or prostitution was occurring 
because of the late hour and the area was not residential and no businesses were open at that 
hour. 
4) Officer Swensen followed the defendant's vehicle and then pulled it over after the 
defendant failed, twice, to signal for lane changes. Officer Swensen informed the defendant of 
the reason for the stop and requested a driver's license. The defendant failed to produce a valid 
driver's license, but stated he did have a valid license. 
5) Officer Swensen briefly asked defendant what had occurred with the unidentified 
person that was seen leaning into the defendant's car. The defendant stated he was out looking 
for boxes because he was helping his sister move and that he had just dropped off the 
unidentified male who was his friend. The questioning on the matter was terminated and the 
whole conversation with the defendant lasted no more than one or two minutes. 
6) Officer Swensen then returned to his patrol car and ran a license check on the 
defendant and was informed that the defendant's license was denied for reinstatement fees. 
Officer Swensen then re-approached the vehicle and asked the defendant to step out of the car in 
order to have him sign a citation for the traffic violations and because he was going to impound 
the vehicle due to the defendant's failure to have a valid license. 
7) When the defendant stepped out of the vehicle, Officer Swensen as part of his 
routine performed a "Terry" frisk for weapons. During the frisk a small white plastic twist fell 
from beneath tht cli'lli in but1 w r ill 'ilhiiiiil Hi lin mm tht* t\i n ,1 In In1 11 imimllul Mihilam i 
Officer Swensen p :e defendant under arrest. A more 'thorough search was then performed 
wherein ihidiliuuru « MUMuv J "ajinLinciis mid >J Ii/ai ulass DILH IH„U Inuiki on Jetendanl 
person. 
CONCLUSIONS OF / 
The brief questioning of the defendant regarding the 'unidentified individual seen learn ny 
into the defendant's vehicle did not exceed the scope of the initial 'traffic stop in violation of tht: 
Fourth Amendment. Such hnH,<|iii1,slioiimjk,l vus irdsonahlc Jiiil li a SUM I1 in ihc officers persoi i;i I 
observation and suspicion that defendant was engaged in other criminal activity such as drugs or 
prostitution 
The brief "Terry"' frisk of defendant for weapons was not conducted in violation of the 
Fourth. -..,ei.Ji;:~,\. . >. ... .^ ,»v .^ ua-,u ,ii dn, .oi no neve the defendant had 
weapons, Uie search was supported b> on uujeciiv. re:;-- - ' "frndlanl ir-. 
armed and dangerous The search was only conducted for officer safety and was supported by 
| | U f o d o H i n o l a c ' S Hn I.Hi n i ' Hil (In III i il 11 (In l i e u i ] n nlh |( i In | ! | i i i | . i i i s i d t i l l l CS i l l At ,M"[ ' 
open business, defendant's odd and inconsistent explanation of his activities, officers belief 
dereiuldin Has engaged uii unif/i 01 pn 'iiiiuiirm ami dial people vino engage In such acti\ ity 
usually carry weapons, the officer was alone, the officer was going to impound defendant's 
"\ ehicle, and defendant s previous false statement about the status of his license. 
ORDER 
Based on the above findings of fact and conclusions of law it is hereby ordered that the 
defendants motion to suppress evidence be denied. 
DATED this _ ^ ? d a y of March 2000. 
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